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Abstract 
Tunisia was the first country south of the Mediterranean to conclude a 
free trade agreement with the European Union in 1995. The agreement is 
expected to promote growth and employment through efficient reallocation 
of resources and scale economies exploitation. The aim of this paper is to 
provide some general equilibrium estimates of the agr ement impact on scale 
economies exploitation as well as on pro-competitiv and varieties effects. 
Simulation results show that welfare gains under monop listic competition 
would be greater than those that would be achieved un er perfect 
competition. The expansion of firm’s average size and the increase of the 
number of available varieties are behind such results, despite the adverse 
terms of trade change. At the sectoral level, the models predict that 
mechanical and electrical machineries, chemicals and textiles, apparel and 
leather are the goods for which Tunisia has a comparative advantage.   
1. Introduction 
Tunisia was the first country south of the Mediterranean to sign 
an association agreement with the European Union (EU) in July 1995. 
The pact called for a gradual removal of all tariff and nontariff barriers 
on industrial goods and the creation of a nonagricultural free-trade 
zone, over a twelve-year transition period. It has been progressively 
implemented since 1996 and came into force on 1998. Actually, 40 
percent of total imports from the EU are now wholly exempt from 
Rim CHATTI 34 
customs duties, while duties for 30 percent of imports have declined 
by 56 percent and the protection of the rest of imports reduced by 34 
percent.   
In the long run, the agreement should enhance growth and 
employment through a better allocation of scarce resources, according 
to the comparative advantage. Furthermore, the access to a larger 
market, should allow the exploitation of scale economies (Jbili and 
Enders (1996)). In this context, computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) models have appeared as proper tools for analyzi g the free 
trade agreement (FTA) between Tunisia and the EU. Whereas 
Rutherford et al. (1995) and Boughanmi (1997) have focused on the 
effects of the arrangement on reallocation of factors f production 
between sectors, Decaluwé and Souissi (1996), Chemingui and Dessus 
(1999) and Dessus and Suwa-Eisenmann (2000) were interested by 
the consequences of the enlargement of the agreement to agricultural 
products. Given revenue importance of tariffs, the fiscal impact of the 
agreement and the search for the optimal replacement taxes have been 
inspected by Devarajan (1997), Chemingui and Dessus (1999) and 
Dessus and Suwa-Eisenmann (2000).  
All these studies are firmly grounded in the traditional trade 
theory. They all assume a combination of constant returns to scale 
(CRTS) and perfect competition. There is therefore no room in these 
studies for the analysis of the potential scale effici ncy effects of the 
agreement, stressed in Jbili and Enders (1996).  
Kress (1994) gives evidence supporting the existence of 
increasing returns to scale (IRTS) in the different Tunisian 
manufacturing industries. With IRTS, firms enjoy market power and 
set price as a markup over marginal cost. Ben Jelili (2001) provides 
estimates of markup ratios for 6 manufacturing industries in Tunisia 
over the period 1975-1999. Markup rates range from 16 to 39 percent 
and they are particularly high in concentrated industries, like 
chemicals. He also finds differences in market power across 
manufacturing industries, which he attributes to differences in entry 
conditions. However, given data limitations, he does not shed light on 
the characteristics of market structures and it is not so obvious 
whether Tunisian manufacturing industries are of oligopolistic or 
monopolistic competition type. 
Given this background, the Tunisian manufacturing idustries 
clearly have features which can be captured only in a model with 
imperfect competition and IRTS. Kress (1994), Cockburn et al. (1999) 
and Chatti (2003) propose an earlier attempt to handle IRTS and 
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imperfect market structures in Tunisian industries within a CGE 
model. Yet, they all assume oligopolistic market structures. In the 
present study, however, the Tunisian manufacturing industries are of 
monopolistic competition type and firms are producing different 
varieties. Brown et al. (1997) already offer some economic effects of 
the FTA between Tunisia and the EU within a setting of monopolistic 
competition and product differentiation at the firm level. But the 
framework we adopt in this paper is somewhat different. It is rather a 
single country model and the world prices of imports are exogenous, 
reflecting Tunisia’s lack of market power on the world markets of 
imports. 
Our model builds on the seminal work by Harris (1984), but 
goes beyond it into two important respects. First, the model does not 
rely on ad hoc pricing rules, but firms are allowed to price 
discriminate between internationally segmented markets. Second, we 
consider both Cournot and Bertrand behaviors. The difference 
between the two is that the former is less competitiv  n the sense that 
it represents a greater departure from perfect competition. Hertel 
(1994) shows, and this study confirms, that the form of firms’ 
assumption about rivals’ reactions affects the magnitude, but not the 
direction of pro-competitive effect of the trade policy.  
The paper is organized as follows. A description of the 
numerical models is given in Section 2, wherein emphasis is placed on 
the modeling of monopolistic competition. The models are used to 
first calibrate, among others, data on market structu es, and then 
replicate the initial equilibrium. The calibration results are provided in 
Section 3. Once the base year equilibrium is replicated, the models are 
used to evaluate the effects of the removal of tariffs on nonagricultural 
EU imports, while maintaining unchanged the protection on the Rest 
of the World (ROW) imports. We capture the effects of this fiscal 
design alternatively under perfect competition and monopolistic 
competition with Cournot or Bertrand conjectures. The simulation 
results are reported and discussed in Section 4. Finally, the paper ends 
with a brief conclusion. 
2. Models description  
Supplies and demands in each market come from the 
independent producers and household optimizing decisions. A detailed 
treatment of sectors and regional trading partners is developed, with 
the multi-regional character of the model being of particular 
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importance. Bilateral trade flows take place with the EU and the 
ROW, identified in the model by the index k.  
Tunisia is modeled either as a small open economy (SOE) or as 
an almost SOE. The SOE assumption means that Tunisian policy 
changes do not alter prices in other regions. This assumption holds 
with CRTS and perfectly competitive firms, whereas the almost SOE 
assumption indicates that Tunisian manufacturing firms alter the 
world prices of exports. The latter holds under theassumption of 
IRTS, monopolistic competition and product differentiation at the firm 
level1. 
In the model, there are 15 sectors producing outputs. Each sector 
is using labor, capital and intermediate inputs. The different sectors 
are identified by indices i and j, with i,j=1,15. When some of these 
sectors are non-competitive, they are identified by the index n. The 
remaining competitive ones (both tradable and non tradable) are 
recognized by the index p.
2.1. The technology 
Domestic output is given by a two-level nesting production 
function. In the first level, final output is produced in a Leontief 
function with the use of intermediate inputs and real value-added. In 
the second level, composite intermediate inputs are demanded with 
fixed (Leontief) input-output coefficients, as there is no scope for 
substitution between sector intermediate demands. A constant 
elasticity of substitution (CES) function describes, however the 
substitutability between labor and capital factors into the real value-
added nest. 
The demands for variable labor and capital at the industry level 
are determined by minimizing total costs of production, subject to the 
nested production function. Then, replacing the first-order conditional 
factors demands into the total cost function of competitive industries, 
gives the total cost of each unit of output. 
As long as unit costs are decreasing with firm's output, marginal 
cost pricing rule induces losses. Thus, firms enjoy market power and 
price mark-up over marginal cost. To model decreasing unit costs and 
                                                
1  Relying on a sample of 23 LDCs, Faini et al. (1992) show that 17 countries, including Tunisia, 
reject the small country hypothesis and the perfectly elastic export demand, which implies 
exogenous world price of exports. Hence, both supply and demand factors interactions explain 
these 17 countries export performance. The authors also show that exports from any LDC compete 
mostly with other LDCs' exports. Therefore price elasticities of export demand are finite but high; 
their study sustains thus the choice of decreasing export demands for Tunisian manufacturing 
sectors. 
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increasing returns to scale (IRTS) in monopolistically competitive 
industries, total cost becomes now equal to the sumof fixed setup 
costs and variable costs. 
Fixed costs combine the minimum fixed capital and labor that 
must be borne by each symmetric domestic firm before starting the 
production of a differentiated good. 
2.2. Firms’ behavior 
Firms' behavior depends on whether they rely on CRTS or IRTS 
technology. When there are CRTS, producers are assumed to behave 
competitively and take a three-step supply decision. First they select 
output levels such that marginal cost at those output levels equals the 
given market price.  
In the second step, competitive producers allocate their output 
between domestic market and foreign market according to a constant 
elasticity of transformation (CET) function. 
Finally, in a third step, firms share out the composite export 
between the different trading partners k by maximizing revenue 
subject to a CET function.  
The competitive equilibrium which follows from CRTS is 
unsuitable with IRTS technology. Then, when production involves 
both fixed and variable costs, some alternative to the competitive 
paradigm has to be considered. 
Given the difference in consumer preferences, transport costs 
and/or trade barriers, the international markets are ssumed to be 
segmented. Thus, in the case of monopolistic competitive industries, 
the non-competitive firms exploit the monopoly power they have on 
each individual (regional) market and may choose separate price and 
supply decisions for each market based on the perceiv d lasticity of 
demand. They also expect to have smaller shares of sales on export 
markets than on the local market. 
With product differentiation at the firm level and monopolistic 
competition market structure, each firm is facing a downward sloping 
demand function for its specific variety, described by (A1.20) and 
(A1.28), and behaves like a monopoly. Given the total cost, the first 
order conditions from profit maximization are such that marginal 
revenue from sales on each market is equal to marginal cost. This 
means that the sale price of products from the home country is 
different on each destination, according to the perceived elasticity of 
demand. It is also greater than the marginal cost by a markup, where 
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the markup reflects the degree of product differentiation and market 
shares. 
It is assumed, in line with Devarajan and Rodrik (199 ), that the 
perceived export demand elasticity in each non-competitive sector is 
exogenous and high; reflecting the home country’s low market power 
in world markets. The perceived domestic demand elasticity is, 
however, derived from the total differentiation of (A1.31). It is 
endogenous and depends crucially on whether monopolistic firms use 
Bertrand or Cournot conjectures when maximizing profits.  
Bertrand pricing means that firms set prices to maxi ize profits, 
taking prices charged by competitors as given, and Bertrand 
equilibrium occurs when each firm’s price is equal to the price that 
other firms expect it to choose. Cournot quantity setting means that 
firms set quantities to maximize profits, taking quantities selected by 
competitors as given and Cournot equilibrium occurs when each 
firm’s quantity is equal to the quantity that other firms expect it to 
choose.  
If firm’s behavior is à la Bertrand, profits maximization with 
respect to domestic price will lead to the perceived domestic demand 
elasticity, given by (A1.13). Yet, if Cournot assumption describes 
firm’s behavior, the perceived elasticity of domestic demand will be 
instead given by (A1.14).2  
When the number of firms becomes large, their monoply ower 
vanishes; reducing their perceived elasticity of domestic demand. To 
ensure such relationship, the common elasticity of substitution among 
the different varieties,nη , and the elasticity of the composite good 
demand, nξ , are chosen so that 0φnn ξη − . In such a case, it is 
straightforward to show that the Cournot elasticity of demand is lower 
than the Bertrand one3. This means that the Cournot case represents a 
greater departure from competition than the Bertrand case, as it 
generates smaller perceived demand elasticity, and larger markup and 
domestic market power. However, the form of firms’ conjecture about 
                                                
2  The analytical expressions of perceived elasticities of domestic demand draw inspiration from 
Smith and Venables (1988), Norman (1990) and Mercenier (1995).  
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their rivals’ reactions affects the magnitude, but no the direction, of 
firms’ market power and production scale changes.  
With free entry and exit, the number of firms (varieties) is 
endogenous and profits are driven to zero.  
2.3. Demands 
The home country is assumed to be a price taker in the world 
market of imports and either a price taker (of homogenous goods) or a 
price maker (of differentiated goods) in the world market of exports. 
The latter assumption is even more realistic when each 
monopolistically competitive firm produces and exports a variety for 
which it has a monopoly power and perceives a downward sloping 
demand curve. 
We consider a representative household who receives income 
from wages and capital revenues. Given this income, the 
representative household decides how to allocate its disposable budget 
between final consumption and saving so as to maximize a Cobb-
Douglas utility function.  In a second step and given the total final 
consumption budget, the representative consumer chooses the level of 
the different composite consumption goods as a fixed budget share in 
total expenditures budget.  
Producers also demand composite goods for intermediate use, 
according to a Leontief input-output technology. 
The model furthermore explicitly features the expenditures 
flows arising from government behavior and the activities of 
investors. The government maximizes a Cobb-Douglas utility function 
over saving and final composite consumption goods, subject to its 
given revenue. The latter derives from direct and iirect taxes 
collection. In addition, the government chooses to allocate its 
consumption budget over the composite goods according to fixed 
shares. 
The investment demands for the different composite 
consumption goods are also assumed to be in fixed share  of total 
investment demand, which is equal to total saving. 
Each composite consumption good is thus a sum of household, 
government and investors’ final consumption demands and all 
producers’ intermediate composite good demands. 
Products of competitive and tradable industries p from different 
geographical origin are deemed to be imperfect substit tes by all the 
domestic purchasers. They nevertheless consider as specific each good 
Rim CHATTI 40 
produced by individual firms operating in the non-competitive 
industries n. The composite good is accordingly an aggregation of 
domestic and imported goods, either through a nested CES 
specification, in competitive and tradable p sectors, or through the 
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) sub-utility function in the imperfectly 
competitive n sectors.  
In the case of national product differentiation, the composite 
import and the domestic goods are imperfect substitutes. Domestic 
buyers therefore trade off composite imports with domestic goods 
according to a CES function. 
To capture the effects of geographically discriminatory 
protection policies, the imports are allowed to bear different tariffs 
depending on their source. This feature allows studying policies such 
accession to a free trade area. Imports from different sources 
substitute with each other at a lower nest to form a composite import 
good for each competitive sector. Then, given a budget for composite 
imports, cost minimization subject to a CES function f composite 
imports from the different regions k, gives the optimal selection of 
imports purchases from the various sources. 
In the case of horizontal product differentiation, the domestic 
demanders have a ''love of variety'', i.e., all the available imported or 
domestic goods are imperfect but close substitutes and the more 
varieties they consume, the more they are satisfied. However, there 
will not be an infinite number of varieties, since fixed costs impose a 
limit to this number. But, if fixed costs are enough low, there will be 
room in the industry for a high number of firms, producing each one a 
specific variety and no two firms produce and sell the same variety. 
Following Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), modelers have typically 
chosen the CES function to add different varieties into a single 
aggregate. Accordingly, demanders minimize the costof purchasing 
all the varieties v of good n subject to a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator.  It is 
also assumed that all varieties and firms are symmetric, so that the 
welfare depends on the number of available varieties. 
Minimizing the cost of purchasing all varieties, subject to the 
Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator, gives the demands for each representative 
domestic and imported variety, (A1.28) and (A1.29). 
As a closure rule, it is also assumed, in this single country model 
of monopolistic competition, that the number of imported varieties 
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from region k matches proportionally any change in the domestic 
number of varieties, by an exogenous constant4. 
In addition to domestic demands for local and imported 
varieties, the model distinguishes decreasing trading partners export 
demands for the home country produced varieties. Only 
manufacturing and thus monopolistic competitive sectors are facing 
foreign decreasing export demands. To keep things tractable, export 
demands are specified at the industry level rather an at the firm 
level, and they are of the constant elasticity form. The foreign demand 
for each domestic variety is then derived by simply dividing total 
exports destined to region k by the number of symmetric domestic 
varieties. 
To close the models description the set of equations a d 
variables of which is given in Appendix A, all demand and supply 
functions are homogenous of degree zero in prices. Hence, only 
relative prices matter. In equilibrium, all prices adjust such that excess 
demands equal zero for all goods and factors, houseld income is 
equal to total expenditures, total saving is equal to total investment 
and total imports net of total exports are equal to the net foreign 
capital inflow. 
The above models of competitive and monopolistic competition 
have been implemented to calibrate then replicate the observed data 
for Tunisia in the base year 1998 and then simulate the impact of the 
removal of tariffs on nonagricultural imports from the EU on welfare 
and sectoral adjustments. 
3. Calibration results 
To carry on calibration, apart from a social accounting matrix 
(SAM), and elasticities of substitution and transformation, information 
on the number of firms in each non-competitive industry is needed5; 
this information is drawn from a secondary source.  
The number of symmetric firms in each industry is estimated on 
the basis of the Herfindahl index concentration. The index provides a 
useful measure of competitiveness: its inverse ratio is an approximate 
measure of the number of equal sized and symmetric firms. Table 1 
displays, in column (1), the Herfindahl index, which reveals that food 
processing and chemicals are the most concentrated industries, with 
                                                
4  This closure rule represents a weakness of the single country model of monopolistic competition 
and horizontal product differentiation, which is overcome in multi-country models. 
5  The calibration technique is exposed in Appendix B. 
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concentration ratios greater than 50%.6  Textiles, apparel and leather, 
and cement, ceramics and quarrying are, on the other hand, the most 
competitive, with concentration ratios around 20%.  
Given the Herfindahl index, the perceived elasticity of domestic 
demand, the elasticity of scale and the number of imported varieties 
from the trading partner k have been calibrated. Columns (3) and (4) 
of Table 1 show respectively the sectoral Bertrand and Cournot 
calibrated elasticity of domestic demand. In all cases, the elasticity in 
the Bertrand case is higher than the Cournot case. This is inherent to 
the fact that the Bertrand behavior is more competitiv , as the market 
power of firms, given by the inverse   ratio   of   the   elasticity   of   
demand,   is  lower  with  Bertrand conjecture. In addition, the more 
concentrated the industry is, the higher is firms’ arket power and the 
lower is the perceived elasticity of demand. 
Table 1 
Calibration Relevant Variables Under Bertrand and Cournot Conjectures 
Calibrated Variables 
Elasticity of domestic 
demand 



















































































































Notes: AGR: agriculture and fishing; FOO: food processing; CCQ: cement, ceramics and quarrying; 
MEM: mechanical and electrical machineries; CHM: chemicals; TEX: textiles, apparel and leather; 
MIS: Miscellaneous manufacture; MNG: mining; ELE: electricity; WAT: water; CON: construction; 
TRA: transport and telecommunication; HAR: hotels and restaurants services; SER: other services; 
PUB: public services. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
                                                
6   The Herfindahl indexes are estimated using the 1993 two- and four-firms cumulated market 
shares, provided in Lahouel (1999). The methodology used to generate the concentration ratios is 
presented in Chatti (1999). 
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As to the extent of unrealized scale economies in each industry, 
we report in columns (4) and (5) the share of fixed costs in total costs. 
The larger is the share of fixed costs in total costs, the higher is the 
elasticity of scale7.  Calibration shows that in the Bertrand case, the 
share of fixed costs varies from 11.6%, in the most c mpetitive textile, 
apparel and leather sector, to 18.2% and 18.4%, in food processing 
and miscellaneous manufacture; two concentrated industries. Nearly 
the same figure appears in the Cournot case. 
4. Counterfactual results of the FTA between Tunisia 
and the EU 
The EU is the main economic and trading partner of Tunisia. In 
recent years, over three-quarters of Tunisia’s trade takes place with 
the EU and the EU is the source of nearly two-thirds of the capital that 
flows into the country.   
Table 2 provides the sectoral features of Tunisia’s tr de in 1998. 
For each of the 11 tradable sectors, the base-year dat  for shares of 
exports in gross output (column 1), imports in total demand (column 
2), and respectively each trading partner imports in total imports 
(columns 3 and 4) and exports in total exports (columns 5 and 6) are 
given.  Generally speaking, average sectoral import dependence is 
greater than export dependence in 1998. The Tunisian economy 
exports 24.5 % of total gross output but imports 27.5% of total 
demand.  
The most export-intensive sectors in the current aggregation are 
hotels and restaurants services (79.6%), textiles, apparel and leather 
(67.7%), mechanical and electrical machineries (45.8%) and 
chemicals (39.1%). Together, these sectors account f r 73.7% of total 
exports in the base year. The most import-dependent s c ors are 
mechanical and electrical machineries (77.6%), textile, apparel and 
leather (62.7%) and chemicals (46.4%). They, together, account for 
69.6% of all imports.   
Columns (3)-(8) confirm that the EU is the main trading partner 
of Tunisia. It is straightforward to see from columns 3 and 5 that 
Tunisia relies upon EU markets for most of its import supply and 
export demand, with economy-wide averages of 73.2% for imports 
and 75.2% for exports. Thus, the potential for trade diversion by 
                                                
7  The share of fixed costs FC in total costs TC is equal to FC/TC = (TC- MC*X)/TC = 1-
(MC*X)/TC = 1- (MC/AC) = 1- 1/ES; where AC represents the unit cost and ES the elasticity of 
scale. 
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Tunisia in response to the FTA with the EU is unlikely to be 
considerable. The ROW is the most important supplier of solely 
agricultural goods (54.5%) and buys three-quarters of Tunisia’s 
cement, ceramics and quarrying products exports and over half of its 
chemicals (60.8%) and mining (55.7%) exports. Generally speaking, 
Tunisia has significantly higher export dependence on the EU than 
import dependence under the 1998 protection patterns. 
As Tunisia is already engaged in sizable amount of trade with 
the EU, it is not strong to argue that the FTA is likely to lead to 
relatively low welfare losses resulting from trade iversion. These 
losses could be overcompensated by potential welfare g ins accruing 
from i) trade creation with EU; ii) efficient resources re-allocation; iii) 
realization of scale economies; iv) greater number of varieties; and/or 
v) terms of trade improvement. 8 
We experiment in this paper a removal of all tariffs on 
nonagricultural goods from the EU, while maintaining unchanged the 
existing protection on all imports from the ROW. This simulation is 
performed under three distinct contexts. First, a domestic industry 
regime of CRTS and perfect competition is considere. Second, 
protection is removed under IRTS with Bertrand conjecture. The third 
context is analogous to the second one, except that we rather use 
Cournot conjecture. In each context, attention is given to the aggregate 
as well as to the sectoral effects of the FTA. The results we provide 
give an estimation of the long run effects of the agreement, at the end 
of the twelve-year transition period. 
The aggregate results of the preferential removal of tariffs on 
nonagricultural imports from the EU with alternative assumptions on 
industries structure and firms’ conjectures are summarized in Table 3. 
In all figures, trade intensifies with both the EU and the ROW as 
Tunisia is trade dependent and the EU imports becom cheaper. As 
expected, the EU absorbs the lion’s share of trade with Tunisia. The 
level of imports from the EU expands from 43.9% with perfect 
competition to 64.3% with Cournot competition. The expansion of EU 
imports switches expenditures away from ROW imports both in 
Bertrand and Cournot cases, which fall identically by 20.4%. Yet, 
given the heavy weight of the EU in Tunisian imports, the diversion of 
imports  from  the ROW is more than offset by the cr ation of imports  
                                                
8  The welfare change resulting from trade policy is decomposed into three distinct effects in Flam 
and Helpman (1987). The scale effect, due to decreasing average cost with output, the varietal 
effect resulting from the number of available varieties change, and the terms of trade effect. The 
trade policy induces welfare gains, if the number of varieties increases and/or the output per firm 
expands and/or the world price of export moves up. 
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Table 2 
Tunisia’s Sectoral Pattern of Trade in 1998 (percent) 
Share of 
imports from 
Share of exports to 
































































































































Notes: M/Q: the share of composite imports in internal demand of each good; EX/X: the share 
of composite exports in sectoral output. The sectoral split of imports by area of origin and 
exports by area of destination relies on Konan and Maskus (2002). See Table 1 for key to 
abbreviations. 
Source: Author’s calculations from 1998 SAM. 
 
with the EU. Indeed, the total volume of Tunisia’s imports grows by 
34.2% under perfect competition and about 40% under monopolistic 
competition. 
The reduction of EU imports cost is globally favorable to local 
producers, whose outputs are intermediate goods intensive; the share 
of intermediate goods in national production is almost equal to 49% in 
1998 and to 73% in non-competitive manufacturing industries. Thus 
production costs lessen. Furthermore, increased import enetration 
raises competitiveness, so expanding firms’ sales to both local and 
foreign markets. The national output increases by 6.4% under perfect 
competition and more than 11% in both Bertrand and Cournot 
competition.  
A share of output growth is occasioned by booming exports to 
both the EU and the ROW, which expand from 35.6% under perfect 
competition to 52% under monopolistic competition.  
Rim CHATTI 46 
Table 3 
Aggregate Effects of Tunisia’s FTA with the EU Under Alternative 









Real exchange rate 
Labor unit price 
Capital unit price 
Consumption price index 
Terms of trade index 
Total output change 
Number of varieties change 
Average output per firm change 
Change of imports volume from : 
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              All 
Change of exports volume to: 
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Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
The FTA appears to be potentially beneficial to Tunisia in every 
case. Equivalent variation aggregate welfare gains ra ge from 3.7% of 
1998 GDP with perfect competition to 4.7% with Cournot conjecture. 
The aggregate effects of the FTA differ, depending upon the extent of 
unrealized scale economies and the conduct of domestic firms. In 
every case, however, increases of labor and capital prices, 
accompanied by a reduction of the consumption price index, 
contribute to the improvement of the representative consumer’s real 
income.   
The aggregate welfare gains with IRTS and monopolistic 
competition are greater than those under perfect competition, since the 
inter-industry resources reallocation gains are stimulated by the 
average output per firm expansion by more than 13.5% and the rise in 
the number of varieties by over 10%, allowing scale efficiency gains 
and positive varieties effects, respectively. The entry of new firms 
does not inhibit incumbent ones to climb up their aver ge cost curves 
as the industry average output level rises by more than 11%. The 
welfare gains in this context could have been more substantial, if there 
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had not been 4.3% deterioration of terms of trade, following excess 
supply of exports.  
As the Bertrand behavior is more competitive than the Cournot 
one, in the latter case, firm’s actions have strong impact on prices. The 
reduction in domestic prices is less significant under the Bertrand 
assumption, leading to positive welfare gains equal to 4.5% but lower 
to those achieved under the Cournot assumption. 
Turning now to a closer examination of sectoral adjustments, 
Table 4 presents sectoral results of the FTA under CRTS and perfect 
competition. Tables 5 and 6 instead report comparable sectoral 
information under monopolistic competition, with resp ctively 
Bertrand and Cournot conjectures. 
Column 1 of Tables 4-6 shows that the price of all liberalized 
EU items goes down. The higher is the initial sectoral protection in 
1998, the stronger is the fall of the corresponding imports price. The 
fall of imports prices varies from 3.5% in the least protected textile, 
apparel and leather to 33.5% in the most protected ement, ceramics 
and quarrying. As a result, except for agricultural European goods, 
which remain protected, the demand of all the remaining EU imports 
expands as it is revealed by Column 2 of the three tables. However, 
for each good, the import demand expansion is stronger when we 
move from perfect competition to monopolistic competition and 
Cournot conjecture, as it is also positively correlat d to the extent of 
national revenue change.  
Column 3 of Tables 4-6 indicates that the representative 
consumer switches expenditure away from the ROW imports of only 
four goods under perfect competition, whereas the substitution of EU 
imports for ROW imports occurs for six out of eleven goods under 
monopolistic competition, explaining why diversion f imports from 
the ROW happens only under the latter market structu e.  
The FTA disturbs in addition the initial equilibrium of both local 
and export markets and the mechanisms by which the final 
equilibrium is achieved on each market are deeply complicated as 
several effects exert competing and opposite influeces.   
When the domestic and/or export sales rise, the levl of output 
expands. This is the actual experience of textile, apparel and leather 
and mechanical and electrical machineries sectors which production 
increases respectively by 91% and 67.5% under perfect competition. 
These are the most booming sectors, with the most important 
production costs reduction. As it can be seen from Column 7 of table 
4, marginal cost reduces in these sectors by 5.1% and 6%, 
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respectively. These leading sectors are followed by three others, i.e. 
electricity, construction and other services, which register small output 
increases equal to 0.6%, 2.5% and 0.4%, respectively. Resources in 
the economy are then reallocated from the ten contracting sectors 
towards the five expanding ones. Production losses vary from low 
1.4% in non-tradable water to 29.9% in cement, ceramics and 
quarrying. 
When we turn to the examination of the sectoral output effects 
of the FTA under monopolistic competition displayed in Tables 5 and 
6, we see that the Bertrand assumption leads to results closely similar 
to the Cournot assumption in qualitative terms. Yet, compared to 
perfect competition, the difference with monopolistic competition is 
both qualitative and quantitative. First, as Column 5 reveals, the 
number of expanding sectors under monopolistic competition is 
greater. Chemicals now add to the five growing sectors under perfect 
competition, with output increasing by 10.2% and 11.4%, 
respectively, with Bertrand and Cournot assumptions. Second, except 
for textiles, apparel and leather, the magnitude of output expansion is 
always higher under monopolistic competition, ranging from a low of 
2.8% (3.1%) in construction to a high of 140% (158%) in mechanical 
and electrical machineries with Bertrand (Cournot) firms’ rivalry.    
As the representative monopolistic firm in manufacturing 
maximizes profits by setting price equal to a markup over marginal 
cost, for a given markup, any identical decrease (increase) of marginal 
cost under monopolistic competition is expected to lead to a higher 
fall (rise) of firm’s prices in absolute terms, compared to perfect 
competition. The fall (rise) in price is more substantial when the 
markup ratio and equally the monopoly power go down (up) and the 
firm’s perceived demand becomes elastic (inelastic); even in relative 
terms. In our model, this is only possible on the loca  market, as the 
perceived export demands and the domestic firms’ monop ly power 
on the world markets are assumed fixed.   
Increased competition allowed by imports penetration, which 
reduces the share of domestic sales in internal demand, and the entry 
of new competitors render the domestic demand faced by firms more 
elastic, as it is illustrated by the expressions (A1.13) and (A1.14) of 
the perceived elasticity of domestic demand. For an ide tical increase 
of the number of firms and decrease of the domestic market share, the 
crumbling of firm’s market power under the Cournot assumption is 
more substantial. 
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Table 4 




























































































































































































Notes: PMEU : the unit price of imports from EU; MEU : imports from EU; MROW : imports from 
ROW; EX : composite exports; XS : industry level output; MC: marginal cost; PD: the unit price of 
the domestic good; PQ : the composite consumption go d price. See Table 1 for key abbreviations. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
Table 5 
















































































































































































































































Notes : PMEU : the unit price of imports from EU; MEU : imports from EU; MROW : imports from 
ROW; EX : composite exports; PWE : the world price of exports; XS : industry level output; LD : 
variable labor demand; KD : variable capital demand; N: number of domestic firms (varieties);  
XS/N: output per firm; MC: marginal cost; Ψd : Bertrand perceived elasticity of demand change; PD: 
the unit price of the domestic good. See Table 1 for key abbreviations. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Table 6 



















































































































































































































































Notes: PMEU : the unit price of imports from EU; MEU : imports from EU; MROW : imports 
from ROW;  EX : composite exports; PWE : the world price of exports; XS: industry 
level output; LD: variable labor demand; KD: variable capital demand; N: number of 
domestic firms (varieties); XS/N: output per firm; MC: marginal cost; Ψd: Cournot 
perceived elasticity of demand change; PD: the unit price of the domestic good. See Table 
1 for key abbreviations. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
    
When the marginal cost diminishes and the perceived domestic 
demand becomes more elastic, the domestic firms perceiv  themselves 
as having much less control over their prices, which reduce, and hence 
increase production, permitting the realization of scale economies. 
All these processes are experienced in four out of six non 
competitive sectors: mechanical and electrical machineries, chemicals, 
textiles apparel and leather and miscellaneous manufacture. In the 
Bertrand variant of the model, the marginal cost in these sectors 
reduces from 2.8% to 15.4% (Column 12) and the increase of the 
perceived elasticity of domestic demand ranges from 0.2% to 1.3% 
(Column13). The smallest change is observed in miscellaneous 
manufacture, whereas the highest variation is regist red in mechanical 
and electrical machineries. These two effects combine to reduce the 
domestic price from 2.9% to 15.7% (Column 14) and the export price 
from 2.8% to 15.5% (Column 7), contributing to the expansion of the 
output per firm from 11.2% in textile apparel and leather to 28.3% in 
mechanical and electrical machineries (Column 9) and thereby the 
exploitation of scale economies.  
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As to the remaining food processing and cement, ceramics and 
quarrying non-competitive sectors, they also experience relatively 
smaller scale efficiency gains measured by the expansion of the firm 
average output, increasing respectively by 3.7% and 5.9%. In cement, 
ceramics and quarrying sector, despite the perceived elasticity of 
domestic demand becomes more inelastic, reinforcing the market 
power of local firms, the marginal cost reduction by 0.3% is enough to 
reduce the domestic and export price by the same rate as marginal 
cost. A quite different picture appears, nevertheless, in food 
processing, which is deeply dependent on agriculture. Indeed, 
marginal cost increases as agricultural products becom  expensive and 
the domestic perceived demand becomes less elastic, leading to an 
increase of both domestic and export price. The average output per 
firm expands, however, in this sector following the intra-industry 
rationalization, since the number of firms in this sector decreases by 
25%. 
The Cournot behavior makes no important differences for the 
effects of the FTA on sectoral production. The policy works in the 
same direction as in the Bertrand case, but since the latter is more 
competitive, each firm’s actions have less impact on prices. 
Comparing Column 10 of Tables 5 and 6 corroborates th  fact that the 
FTA leads to greater domestic price reduction in five out of six 
monopolistic competitive sectors under the Cournot assumption. The 
greater magnitude of price reductions means that firm’s scale of 
production expands more than in the Bertrand case, leading to larger 
scale efficiency and welfare gains.  
5. Conclusion 
The aim of this paper is to quantify the potential effects of the 
FTA between Tunisia and the EU. The focus of the paper is on scale 
economies and horizontal product differentiation. Reaping scale 
economies provides an additional source of potential gain from trade 
liberalization, which is thought to be important in the Tunisian case 
because of the small size of its national market.  
Three models were built. The first one is a standard small open 
economy CGE model with perfect competition and CRTS. It 
represents a reference framework to compare with two others models 
with IRTS, monopolistic competition and product differentiation at 
the firm level. The latter differ by the assumption about the conjecture 
of firm about its rivals’ reactions: Bertrand or Cournot. 
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The computational results from the model with perfect 
competition indicate that strong inter-industry specialization occurs, 
with output declining in ten of the fifteen sectors and exports 
declining in nine of the eleven tradable sectors. The FTA is especially 
favorable to mechanical and electrical machineries and textile, apparel 
and leather and to a less extent to electricity, water nd other services. 
These are the five sectors experiencing output expansion. Intersectoral 
specialization is responsible in the competitive context for an increase 
in Tunisian welfare by 3.7% of 1998 GDP, as captured by the 
equivalent variation. 
With IRTS, monopolistic competition and horizontal product 
differentiation, the inter-sectoral specialization gains are intensified by 
scale efficiency and varieties gains. Inter-industry specialization 
produces the contraction of nine of the fifteen sectors, as chemicals 
output also expands. Scale efficiency gains result essentially from pro-
competitive effects, reducing firms’ market power, and lowered 
marginal cost, resulting from cheaper imports. These two effects 
combine to translate into a drop of producers prices and increased 
production.  
Except for food processing and cement, ceramics and quarrying, 
scale efficiency gains occur in the remaining four non-competitive 
sectors, despite the entry of new firms. Indeed, the industry output 
expansion is greater than the increment in number of firms. 
Furthermore, the varieties gains in the latter sectors overcompensate 
the varieties losses in the rationalized sectors, leading to an overall 
increase of the number of varieties in the economy.  
Tunisia thus would significantly benefit from capturing scale 
economies and increased product variety that the FTA should make 
possible. Further, the influx of tariff-free imports will improve the 
competitive environment for firms selling domestically, with the result 
that price-cost margins reduce following the rise in the elasticity of 
demand perceived by producers. Increasing firm output, thereby 
reducing average total cost, is a key source of welare gain in this 
imperfectly competitive context. The Tunisian welfare improves by 
4.5% in the Bertrand case and 4.7% in the Cournot case. 
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Appendix A 
Model equations, variables and parameters 
A1. List of equations 
There are i,j = 1,s sectors (and goods), of which p = 1,c are 
competitive and n = c+1,s are non competitive. We also distinguish k 
trading partners denoted r, with r = 1,k. 
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Cournot perceived 
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Demand of imports, 
competing with 
competitive firms 
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Aggregate demand of 
local varieties 
 
nnn dfNDDD ×=  (A1.31) 
 
Aggregate demand of 
imported varieties 
nknknk mfNMMR ×=  (A1.32)             
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Representative 
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(A1.38) 
Government saving ( )YGshrcgSG −= 1  (A1.39) 
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Government demand 
of composite good i i
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(A1.40) 
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Investment demand by 
sector of origin i
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General equilibrium conditions 















i NDkfKDKS  
(A1.46) 
  
Domestic good market 
clearing condition 
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A.2. List of endogenous variables  
iX  Gross production of sector i 
pPX  Composite production price (in competitive 
sectors) 
iLD , iKD  Variable labor and capital used by sector i 
iVC  Unit cost of primary factors 
W , R  Rent of capital and wage rates 
iMC , nFC , iTC  Marginal, fixed and total costs 
nND , nkNM  Domestic and imported varieties 
iDD , iDS  Domestic demand and supply of good i 
ikEXR , ikMR  Levels of export to and import from region k of 
good i 
ikPER , ikPMR  Unit prices of export to and import from region 
k of good i 
pM , pEX  Levels of composite import and export 
nkexf , ndf , nkmf  Exported, locally sold and imported varieties at 
the firm level 
iPD , pPE , pPM  Prices of locally produced goods, composite 
exports and imports 
iQ  Composite consumption good i 
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iPQ  Price of composite consumption good i 
nPWE  Endogenous world price of export of good n 
d
nψ  Perceived elasticity of domestic demand 
  
YM , YG Household and government revenue 
SH , SG, S  Household, government and total saving 
iC , iINV , iCGG  Households, investors and government demand 
for the composite consumption good i 
CH  Household’s total expenditures 
ER  The exchange rate 
ijCI  Intermediate demand for composite 
consumption good i by sector j 
A.3. List of exogenous variables and parameters 
iε , pκ , pρ , pθ , pσ , pη  Elasticities of substitution in CES and CET 
functions 
iβ , pkµ , pkα , pδ , pγ  Share parameter in CES and CET functions 
iAX , pBX , pBE , nA , 
pBM , pBR  
Shift parameters 
nlf , nkf  Fixed labor and capital by firm 
LS , KS  Labor and capital supply 
YMt , itx , itm  Income, consumption and trade taxes 
ija  Input-output coefficients 
ikPWM , pkPWE , nPWROW  World prices of import and export 
e
nkψ  Perceived elasticity of export demand 
B  Budget deficit 
iΩ ,  iΛ , iχ  Share parameters 
shrcg, shrc  Share parameters 
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Appendix B 
Calibration procedure in monopolistic competition models 
   
It is common, in CGE models with IRTS and imperfect 
competition, to calibrate the marginal, average andfixed costs using 
information on estimated elasticities of scale, provided by the 
literature9. Given the lack of information on the ratios of average to 
marginal cost in the different Tunisian manufacturing ndustries, the 
elasticities of scale are rather calibrated10. This technique, which relies 
on Brown and Stern (1989) and Mercenier (1995), has been so far 
implemented within multi-country CGE models. We here fit it to an 
almost small country CGE model. 
To begin, a composite price PXn is defined as a weighed average 



















PDPX                                (B.1) 
The value of total supply of goods produced in each non-
competitive industry n, which is equal to the sum of sales on domestic 













nknn EXRDSPXEXRPERDSPD                   (B.2) 
Multiplying and dividing simultaneously the right-hand side of 
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9  Devarajan and Rodrik (1991) and De Melo and Tarr (1992) provide detailed explanation of 
marginal, average and fixed costs calibration relying on external information on the elasticities of 
scale and  substitution. 
10 Kress (1994) shows the existence of IRTS in the Tunisian manufacturing industries. However, his 
estimates of the elasticity of scale in the different industries are unreasonably high. In addition, his 
models suffer from multicollinearity. 
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Given the zero profit condition in the base year, the composite 
price PXn is also equal to the average costs ACn. If the composite price 
PXn is normalized to one and the levels of the perceived elasticities of 
demand are calculated according to (A1.13) or (A1.14), then the 
values of domestic and foreign sales, nnPDDS and nknkPEREXR , 
given from the base year data, could also be used to calibrate the 
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Once marginal cost is calibrated, the normalization 
rule 1== nn ACPX  allows calibrating the elasticities of scale ESn, 




1=                                                                        (B.6) 
Given ESn and the values of total costs, provided in the base 
year data, the fixed costs components as well as the fixed primary 
factors are calibrated in a conventional way. For this we refer to De 
Melo and Tarr (1992). 
The final step of calibration consists in deriving the number of 
imported varieties NMnk from each trading partner k. Given the 
information on the number of existing symmetric domestic firms in 
each industry in the base year, the calibrated price of each domestic 
variety PDn and normalizing the unit price of each imported variety 
from region k, PMRnk to one, the numbers of imported varieties from 
each region are calibrated according to equations (A1.28)-(A1.29) and 



























Rim CHATTI 62 
Özet 
Ölçek ekonomileri, yatay ürün farklılaştırması ve Tunus ile AB 
arasındaki serbest ticaret anlaşması: Bazı genel denge etkileri 
Tunus, Akdeniz’in güneyindeki ülkelerden AB ile 1995 yılında serbest ticaret anlaşması 
yapmış olan ilk ülkedir. Bu anlaşmanın etkin kaynak tahsisi ve ölçek ekonomilerinden 
yararlanma yolu ile büyüme ve istihdamı teşvik etmesi beklenmektedir. Makalenin amacı, 
anlaşmanın ölçek ekonomilerinden doğacak kazanımları ile rekabet ve ürün çeşitl ndirme 
etkilerini genel denge analizi çerçevesinde tahmin etmektir. Simülasyon sonuçları, tekelci 
rekabet koşulları altında erişilecek refah kazançlarının tam rekabet koşulları altında erişilecek 
olandan yüksek olduğunu ortaya koymaktadır. Ticaret hadlerindeki olumsuz gelişmelere karşın 
böyle bir sonuç elde edilebilmesi, ortalama firma büyüklüğünün ve ürün çeşitlili ğinin artması 
dolayısıyladır. Modellerin sektörel düzeydeki bulguları Tunus’un elektriksiz ve elektrikli 
makinalar, kimya, dokuma-giyim ve deride karşılaştırmalı üsütünlüğe sahip bulunduğunu 
öngörmektedir. 
 
 
 
 
 
